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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ENID COSGEIFF MUKPHY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
13748
MICHAEL EDWAKD MUKPHY,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for divorce.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent was awarded a decree of divorce, restoring her former married name, confirming her ownership of assets acquired before this marriage or by inheritance or devise afterwards, directing return of a
promissory note she held from appellant and rejecting
appellant's belated claim that respondent should share
in losses purportedly sustained by appellant because of
this marriage.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will hereinafter be designated as they
appeared in the trial court.
1
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,, The statement of facts in defendant's brief is not
accepted by plaintiff and should not be favorably considered by this court since it is essentially limited to
facts defendant emphasized on trial to support his claim
for contribution but ignores or minimizes the effect of
facts tending to support the findings and decree by the
trial court.
Thus, the statement of facts does violence to the
long-standing principle that in divorce cases, the Supreme Court will "assume that the trial court believed
the evidence which supports the findings'' and "will review the whole evidence in the light most favorable to
them;. . . " Stone v. Stone (1967) 19 Utah 2d 378, 431 P.
2d. 802.
Plaintiff therefore presents, in the following statement of facts, the evidence the trial court reasonably
could have believed in reaching its decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This marriage in 1964 was the defendant's first.
He was then 46 and plaintiff was 52. They had no chilren (E. 1,244). Previously, plaintiff had been married
for 24 years to "Walter E. Cosgriff, President of Continental Bank & Trust Company in Salt Lake City,
which marriage terminated in 1961 with Mr. Cosgriff's
death in an automobile crash (R. 98).
By her complaint, the plaintiff asked for a divorce
and restoration of her former married name. In paragraph 5 of her complaint, plaintiff alleged that neither
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she nor the defendant was dependent upon the other
for financial support, since defendant was a physician
in private practice and plaintiff had independent financial means. Plaintiff therefore waived any right to alimony. Plaintiff also alleged that the rights of the
parties to such property as had been acquired by them
during the marriage were being adjusted between them
and thus, she did not ask the court for assistance on that
subject (B. 1,2).
By his answer and counterclaim, defendant denied
the allegations of paragraph 5 and alleged instead that
the parties were the owners of assets which he estimated
had a value "in excess of three million dollars". He demanded judgment against the plaintiff allocating
$300,000.00 to himself and requiring payment of more
than $37,000.00 in obligations owed on his Minnesota
farm properties (B. 5,6).
In a proceeding prior to trial, the trial court ordered, on April 18, 1974, that counsel for the respective
parties were to prepare and file with the court by April
29, 1974, a statement of the assets of the respective
parties and the assets, if any, of the marital estate, together with a j^roposed plan of distribution of such assets in the event the court should grant a decree of divorce (B, 38,39). Plaintiff's statement, dated April 29,
1974 listed her assets as of April 17, 1974 as consisting
of cash, bank stocks and miscellaneous items of a total
value of $1,528,522.18. As shown by the statement, and
as conceded upon trial, (B. 111,155) these assets were
given to plaintiff by her late husband Walter E. Cos3
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griff or were received by her prior to the marriage herein upon the distribution of the estate of J. E. Cosgriff
or were received by her upon distribution of estates of
other members of the Cosgriff family which estates were
in the process of probate at the time of the marriage
to the defendant (R. 56 to 60).
Plaintiff proposed that the court confirm her as
the owner of those listed assets since all had been acquired from her former husband or from the estates of
various members of the Cosgriff family and none of
the assets had been acquired from or received from the
defendant. Plaintiff also proposed that any sums the
defendant had obtained from the sale of his Minnesota
farm properties and equipment be confirmed as property of the defendant and she also offered to return to the
defendant, without payment, a note for $22,500.00 which
note had been carried by her on her statement of assets
without value (R. 58,59, 60).
The statement submitted by the defendant did not
show the value of assets at or near the time of trial.
Instead, there was submitted an exhibit purporting to
show the defendant's net worth immediately prior to
the marriage and the value of assets he owned as of a
date more than 14 months prior to trial. This exhibit,
together with others, purported to demonstrate that defendant had experienced a decrease in net worth during
and because of the marriage totalling $133,990.00 and
he proposed that the court require the plaintiff to pay
to defendant an amount equal toi one-half of that loss or
$66,995.00 (R. 46-55). Defendant makes the same claim
in this court as shown by his brief at pages 19 and 20.

4
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Defendant is a physician who received training at
the Mayo Clinic in his specialty of internal medicine.
At the time of trial he was in good health and practicing his specialty in Las Vegas, Nevada. Hei claimed he
did not know what his income had been from his practice in previous years because he had not received figures from his accountants since December 1972. When
pressed to give the court at least an estimate of his income from the practice of medicine, he snapped " I ' m
not an economist. I'm a physician." Since he had only
been in Las Vegas about one year, he stated it was premature to determine if he was making the kind of income he had hoped to make when he moved to Las Vegas but he finally estimated his income at about $40,000.00
taxable income per year (R. 151 to 53).
Upon trial, defendant repudiated that portion of his
counterclaim in which he demanded a $300,000.00 award
and he specifically disclaimed any right to share in the
assets plaintiff had acquired from her former husband
or from the estates of the Cosgriff family (R. 142, 155).
In lieu of the demand in the counterclaim, defendant urged the court to order the plaintiff to contribute
to a loss which defendant had purportedly sustained by
reason of the marriage totalling $133,990.00. That claim
is repeated in this court. The manner in which the claim
was computed may be determined by examining the financial exhibit (R. 50) submitted to the court prior to
trial. That exhibit shows defendant contends that he
sustained a loss in the sale of various real and personal
properties and in the sale of his Salt Lake City medical
practice.
5
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However, it soon developed on cross-examination
that each item of property listed on the exhibit had been
sold by the defendant of his own volition and he had received the proceeds of each sale and applied them to his
own needs and purposes. During a previous separation
of the parties in 1968, defendant sold the Brighton cottage at a price much less than its value and he listed
and sold the home on Fortuna Way in Salt Lake City
for $53,000.00, a price offered by a willing buyer. Deendant agreed he received and used the proceeds from
these sales (R. 252,253).
After the parties reconciled in late 1968, defendant
sold two of his three automobiles and his medical practice because he needed money to pay the farm bills which
had been incurred in the operation of the farm he had
acquired before this marriage and which he had begun
to operate ;just prior to the marriage (R. 248, 253, 254).
The largest single item of loss claimed by the defendant on his exhibit (R, 50) is the total of $113,600.00
purportedly lost by him because of a sale of the farm
property in Minnesota. However, on cross-examination
the defendant admitted that he made the sale of that
property in late March 1973, about ten months after the
parties finally separated and that he felt compelled to
sell because he had experienced adverse weather conditions the previous year and when he applied for federal loan assistance for the coming year, he learned that
the President had impounded such loan funds and thus
he did not believe he could operate the farm through
another year without financial assistance. He sold the
6
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entire farm including all equipment, buildings and livestock to a land speculator for an amount which he conceded was substantially less than he could have obtained
in other circumstances and at no time did he either inform the plaintiff, consult with her about the wisdom of
the sale or offer to account to her for the proceds of the
sale after it had been completed (R. 158, 159, 160).
Cross-examination also revealed that in each of the
eight years in which defendant filed his Federal Income
Tax Return as a married1 man filing separately, he had
shown substantial farm operation losses which exceeded
his medical practice income; thus he paid no income tax,
did not share any of the farm proceeds with the plaintiff and did not ask her to share the losses (R. 251).
Defendant also conceded that during the course of
this marriage, the plaintiff had made gifts to the defendant of cash or property of the total value of $68,994.00
(R.268).
Much of the foregoing evidence concerning the loss
defendant claimed to have suffered by reason of this
marriage wras received over the vigorous and continued
objection of plaintiff. One of the grounds of the objection was that defendant did not seek this relief in his
counterclaim and therefore the proof and the theory
were outside the issues presented by the pleadings (R.
196). Defendant moved the court for its order permitting him to amend the counterclaim but the court denied
the motion "at this time" and thereafter heard much
of the evidence just described (R. 197 et seq.). After
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hearing all of the evidence, the court again heard argument on the subject and then, by minute entry of May 6,
1974, the motion to amend was denied (R. 44).
As is frequently true in a divorce case, there was
conflicting evidence concerning the mental cruelty which
plaintiff had alleged in her complaint. Plaintiff testified, and the court apparently believed, that defendant
had been vocally critical of her personality, her appearance, her friendships and almost every other aspect of
her make up (R. 98). Plaintiff was and is a devout Catholic and attended mass daily and thus, defendant's derogatory remarks about Catholic clergy and lay members of the Catholic order offended her deeply (R. 99)
and defendant characterized her belief that Jesus Christ
is the son of God as "garbage" which she viewed as
blasphemy (R, 100,199).
Defendant increased his criticism after the parties
moved to Minnesota to the point that plaintiff testified
his faultfinding, criticism and arrogance became even
more frequent and when she remonstrated with him, he
would refuse to speak to her for days at a time and all
of this conduct, according to plaintiff's testimony, made
her constantly upset and nervous and caused her to endure insomnia for several weeks at a time (R. 98, 103,
107).
Defendant, upon cross-examination, agreed that he
and the plaintiff had had marked differences of opinion
on a great many subjects and he conceded that a continuation of the marriage would be intolerable (R. 245, 246).
8
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Based upon all of the foregoing evidence, the trial
court made its findings, reached its conclusions of law
and entered a decree awarding plaintiff an interlocutorydecree of divorce, confirming her ownership of the assets she had acquired outside of the marriage, confirming defendant's ownership of the proceeds of the sales
of his property, restoring plaintiff's former married
name, awarding no alimony or costs and directing that
plaintiff return to defendant, without payment, a note
signed by the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for
$22,500.00. Plaintiff promptly returned the note (B. 78)
and after defendant's motion to amend the findings of
fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce was denied by the court (E. 80, 81, 82) this appeal followed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FOE CONTRIBUTION WAS NEITHEE TIMELY NOE SUPPOETED BY THE EVIDENCE AND THE
TEIAL COURT PEOPEELY EEJECTED IT.
In his counterclaim dated and filed February 28,
1973, defendant alleged that both parties had contributed to the accumulation and preservation of substantial
assets which were estimated by defendant to have a
value of more than three million dollars. Of that total
sum, defendant alleged that there were "cash and other
liquid assets estimated in the amount of $1,900,000.00"
in Utah, Nevada, Montana and Idaho and of that sum,
he asked that the court award him $300,000.00 (E. 4, 5).
9
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He made no claim that the marriage had resulted
in a decrease in his net worth nor did he claim that the
marriage had resulted in a loss to him which plaintiff
should be required to share.
In her reply to the counterclaim, plaintiff denied
that the parties owned substantial assets and affirmatively alleged that the assets she owned were not part
of any marital estate and she denied that defendant had
made any contribution of substance "to such marital estate as may be found to exist" (R. 10,11).
Defendant made no attempt to amend his pleadings or to change the issues framed by the pleadings until the case came on for trial more than a year later.
However, upon trial defendant never offered any evidence to support his claim that there was a substantial
marital estate or that he had made contributions to it.
Instead, shortly after the trial began, defendant conceded that he did not claim any right to the assets which
plaintiff had acquired from her former husband or from
the estates of members of the family and it was also
conceded at that same time that defendant no longer
denied plaintiff's allegation that each of the parties was
self-supporting and neither required support from the
other (R. 155).
By these concessions, defendant effectively destroyed the basis of the allegations in his counterclaim
concerning the financial relationship of these parties.
He then began his attempt to establish a new and different claim to the effect that during the marriage he
10
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had sustained a decrease in his net worth resulting in
a loss of $133,990.00 which plaintiff should share by a
contribution of one-half of the loss or $66,995.00 (E. 4655,156).
Plaintiff objected to evidence offered in support of
this new claim and the objection was at first sustained
(E. 145) but after the weekend recess, during which the
court presumably reflected upon the matter, the court
stated that plaintiff's continuing objection would be recognized but that defendant would be permitted nevertheless to proceed (E. 193).
Defendant therefore proceeded to testify concerning each of the properties and assets which may be
found listed on his financial exhibit submitted to the
court before trial (E. 50) and attempted to show that
as to each of the enumerated assets, a loss had been sustained, reaching the total of more than $133,000.00 (E.
193etseq.).
Defendant offered testimony concerning the value
and disposition of each of the assets which form the financial exhibit (E. 50) and he contended in the trial
court, and reiterates here in the first three points in his
brief, that the items of personal and real property shown
on the exhibit each had a specific financial value and
each had been totally lost as a result of this marriage.
Defendant's contention ignores a basis principle of evidence that " testimony of a witness on his direct examination is no stronger than as modified or left by his
further examination or by his cross-examination." Alii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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varado v. Tucker (1954) 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986.
In the light of that principle, the following paragraphby-paragraph summary will describe each of these items
of real and personal property and show what happened
to it:
FORTUNA

WAY

HOUSE

Defendant sold this house in 1968, during a previous brief separation of these parties, for $53,000.00
which was the price a willing buyer agreed to pay after
the property had been listed with a realtor. After payment of mortgages, selling commission and closing costs,
defendant received $13,000.00 which he testified he
needed to pay farm bills for the Minnesota farm property he had inherited in 1963 and which he had begun to
operate as a farm just prior to this marriage (R. 209,
248,252).
BRIGHTON CANYON

COTTAGE

This property is listed on the financial exhibit at
a value of $20,000.00 but defendant admitted he made
the decision to sell that cottage, prior to the former
temporary separation of the parties, and had in fact
sold it for $8,000.00 which he then knew was not a reasonable price because he recognized the sale was made
at far less than market value. The proceeds of that
sale were kept and used by him. (R. 252).
MINNESOTA

FARM AND

EQUIPMENT

Defendant claimed in his financial exhibit that the
Minnesota farm and its equipment had a value of
12
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$113,600.00 immediately prior to this marriage. The
farm, known as the Murphy farm, had been inherited
by him in 1963 and he had "just barely begun" to operate the farm shortly before these parties were married.
Thereafter, an adjoining farm, known as the Sullivan
farm, was purchased under a real estate contract with
the financial assistance of the plaintiff. As parti of the
arrangements for reconciliation following the 1968 separation of these parties, defendant gave plaintiff a release of any obligation she might owe on the Sullivan
farm (Ex. 22P) and thereafter improvements of the
buildings on the two farms were made and additional
equipment and stock were acquired. Defendant decided
to move to Minnesota to be closer to the farm ojDeration
in 1969 and he operated the farm as his sole enterprise
and never as a joint enterprise with plaintiff. During
eight of the taxable years these parties were married,
defendant reported his farm income on his own income
tax returns, utilizing claimed losses from the farm operation as deductions against his medical practice income and never once claimed plaintiff was a part of the
farm operation. Finally, after a disastrous farm year
because of high water and other problems in 1972, defendant applied for federal loan assistance, intending
to continue farming in 1973 but when the President impounded funds for such loans, defendant sold the entire
farm acreage, all of its buildings and their furnishings,
all of the farm equipment including granaries, feeders
and silos, plus all livestock to a speculator for a total
price of $280,000.00, which defendant conceded was considerably less than he could have obtained if he had
13
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sold the properties to someone other than a speculator.
Defendant did not inform plaintiff of the sale nor account to her afterwards for any of its proceeds (K. 156,
157,160,251,258,259,260).
AUTOMOBILES
Defendant's exhibit (E, 50) listed three automobiles,
two of which he had as of the beginning of the marriage
and one which was acquired afterwards. The latter automobile was still in defendant's possession at the time
of trial. The first two automobiles, having a value defendant claimed of $6,500.00, were sold by him for an
amount he did not disclose but, in any event, he took
the money from the sales of those cars and applied it in
payment of bills he had incurred on the farm (E. 253,
254).
MEDICAL

PRACTICE

Defendant's exhibit showed he valued his former
medical practice in Salt Lake City at $15,000.00, consisting of $10,000.00 in accounts receivable and $5,000.00
in equipment and goodwill. At the time of the marriage,
defendant had just begun to operate the farm he inherited in Minnesota and he apparently intended to continue his medical practice in Salt Lake City and to visit
the farm only periodically to oversee the activities of
someone hired to run the farm (E, 248). However, in
1968, he decided it was necessary that he live closer to
the farm and he made the decision to move to Minnesota
in 1969. He testified that he knew he would be taking
a "big financial loss" in his medical practice but "I felt
14
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I could somehow compensate for it by being there close
to the farm and running them (sic) more economically"
(R. 270). He sold his medical practice in Salt Lake City
to Dr. Ron Ward who thereafter paid him for the practice with regular payments over a period of time. The
purchaser collected some of the accounts receivable and
sent the proceeds to the defendant and the remainder
of the accounts were collected by the Continental Bank
which forwarded the collected amounts to him (R. 249,
250). Thus, it was demonstrated conclusively that the
sale of the medical practice resulted from defendant's
own decision to move to Minnesota and that all of the
money from that sale was received by the defendant.
There was, therefore, no basis for defendant's claim that
plaintiff's conduct had forced him to lose the entire
value of the medical practice and that plaintiff should
help regain that loss by a contribution of one-half.
COUNTRY CLUB MEMBERSHIP
SECURITIES

AND

Defendant had received the country club membership as a gift from the plaintiff and he admitted he had
sold it for his own purposes although the amount he
received was not disclosed (R. 254). There was never
any testimony concerning the nature of the securities
defendant allegedly had owned and later lost and thus
the only evidence concerning the assets listed on the
final portion of his financial exhibit (R. 50) showed he
had converted the assets to his own use.
Although defendant contends the trial court erred
in not permitting him to amend his counterclaim to
15
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claim contribution from the plaintiff, it is clear from
the record that defendant was not prejudiced by that
ruling because defendant was permitted to introduce
the evidence concerning that theory and this record conclusively demonstrates that the evidence simply failed
to establish the claim so that the court was amply justified in rejecting it.
Defendant also claims the trial court erred in rejecting evidence concerning what defendant might have
done with his assets and what his financial position
might have been if he had not married the plaintiff (R.
230 et seq.). The following excerpt from the transcript
illustrates the nature of the proof which was offered
and rejected:
Q. (By Mr. McMurray) Now, Dr. Murphy, if
you had not married Enid Cosgriff, can you
state with reasonable certainty whether or
not you would have continued your medical
practice here in Salt Lake City!
Mr. Snow: Objection. Objected to as immaterial and irrelevant. They did get married,
and he was a grown man at the time.
The Court: Sustained.
Q.

(By Mr. McMurray) Dr. Murphy, can you
state with reasonable certainty if it hadn't
have been for your marriage to Enid Cosgriff whether or not you would still be owning the basic acreage which you inherited in
Minnesota, the 312 acres, the Brighton property that you have described, the cottage, the
canyon property, and the house on Fortuna
Wavf
16
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Mr. Snow: Objection. Objected to, your
Honor, for the reasons previously stated and
also because it's pure speculation. It is totally irrelevant and immaterial to the issues
in this ease.
The Court: Sustained. (R. 239,
These parties had been married ten years at the
time of the trial. The proffered evidence, seeking to
elicit what might have occurred during that ten year
period but for the marriage, constituted pure and unbridled speculation and could have furnished no proper
basis for the court to make any finding concerning an
alleged loss.
The evidence offered by the defendant appeared to
represent an attempt by him to claim that the court
should ignore the fact that these parties were properly
married in 1964 and had continued to live as man and
wife at least the next nine years. Defendant accepted
such benefits as were provided by the marriage but
would have had the court ignore the fact and attempt
to treat the rights of the parties as if the marriage had
never occurred. Defendant, having participated in the
marriage ceremony and in the married life that followed
and, by his counterclaim, having sought to terminate
the marriage by a divorce, may not now properly ask to
be restored to the condition in which he found himself
prior to the marriage.
Neither in the trial court nor in his brief in this
court does defendant cite any authority which would
lend even remote support to the theory he has advanced
17
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and this is, perhaps, for the very good reason there is
no legal precedent for his position.
In the first three points of his brief, dealing with
his claim for contribution, defendant pleads for "equitable treatment" and it is thus ironic to note that his financial exhibits completely ignore the substantial financial contributions which, as his testimony reveals, plaintiff had made to him or to his various properties. The record shows that plaintiff gave him $15,000.00 for the
down payment on the Sullivan farm purchase contract
(R. 202, 203), paid $6,500.00 for remodeling the Sullivan farm home (R. 210), purchased an adjacent woodlot (R. 209) and paid for the remodeling of the main
farmhouse (R. 210, 212). Prior to the departure for
Minnesota, plaintiff had made substantial contributions
to the improvement of the Brighton cottage (R. 194)
and it is a reasonable inference from the evidence that
she made other substantial and continuing contributions
to the payment of the living expenses of these parties
because defendant admitted, and his exhibits reveal, that
all of the earnings from his medical practice in Minnesota went into the farm (Ex. 20-D, R. 244). Aside from
payment of daily living expenses, plaintiff's contributions formed part of her gifts to the defendant of more
than $68,000.00 since 1967, which gifts defendant reluctantly conceded he had received (R. 268).
Defendant seeks equity but he is not willing to bestow it. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in rejecting his assorted claims for contribution and
its action should be affirmed and endorsed by this court.
18
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POINT I I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN AWARDING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE TO PLAINTIFF.
Although defendant contends the evidence respecting the grounds for divorce preponderated in his favor,
he has demonstrated no compelling reason why the trial
court should have granted the divorce to him, instead
of to the plaintiff. He does not contend, in his brief in
this court, that no divorce should have been granted at
all and he appears to concede, as he did in the trial
court, that this marriage is beyond salvation.
As is clearly shown in plaintiff's statement of facts,
found earlier in this brief, plaintiff's testimony provided ample grounds for the court to conclude a divorce
was required and to award it to plaintiff. Even if the
trial court had also found that defendant had produced
grounds for divorce, the ultimate result would have been
for the court to order a dissolution of this marriage because, in either event, the evidence would have shown
clearly that this marriage is at an end.
As this court observed in its 1971 decision in Mullins
v. Mullins 26 Utah 2d, 485 P.2d 663:
When a divorce is granted to one, both of the
spouses effectively are divorced. There seems
to be nothing in our statute or in logic that would
prevent a dissolution of the marriage by granting a divorce to both, where the facts fault each
equally as respect to grounds therefor — if such
procedure would make anybody happy. Whether
19
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one or the other or both should be given a divorce should be left to the sound discretion of the
trial court based on the evidence adduced.
Defendant has suggested no reason why this court
should substitute its judgment for the studied determination by the trial court that plaintiff should be awarded
a divorce. This court has frequently observed that the
trial court is in an "advantaged position" because it observes the witnesses as they testify and is thus in a position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the
extent to which their testimony should be believed. Stone
v. Stone supra; Searle v. Searle (1974) — Utah 2d —
522 P.2d 697 and cases therein cited.
The Searle case also repeats the long-standing rule
on appeal in this court that "the burden is upon appellant to prove such a serious inequity as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion". The defendant, in his claim
that the decree should have been awarded to him or to
both of the parties, has failed to carry that burden in
this court.

CONCLUSION
Defendant, by his counterclaim, alleged that the
"parties are owners of substantial assets" which were
estimated to be of a value in excess of $3,000,000.00, of
which defendant demanded $300,000.00 as his share. As
the trial neared and it became apparent there was no
such marital estate, defendant abandoned his counter20
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claim demand and conceded that he had no right to share
in the assets plaintiff had received by gift before marriage or by inheritance or devi se afterward.
Developments upon trial proved that defendant's
concession was more illusory than real. While disclaiming any right to plaintiff's assets, defendant sought to
obtain a sizeable portion of them by the belated claim
that plaintiff should share in losses allegedly sustained
by the defendant because of the marriage and because
of plaintiff's "enthusiasm and encouragement" (R. 142)
as defendant expanded his farm operation. When the
evidence revealed the defendant operated the farm as
his own, taking such income benefits as it produced and
claiming such tax credits as its losses permitted, defendant then attempted to support a claim by offering evidence concerning what his financial condition might have
been if he had not entered into this marriage ten years
earlier.
The trial court saw this for what it was — a plain
attempt to gain indirectly that which the law and the
facts would not permit him to gain directly. Defendant
is a medical doctor without obligations of any kind and
he is presently earning $40,000.00 a year and obviously
will make more as he becomes better known in his community. Although defendant's brief would leave the impression that he is without assets, he volunteered to the
trial court (R. 176) that if a doctor earns $50,000.00 a
year "that's the equivalent of having a million dollars
in assets, I guess, the current return rates."
21
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Under these facts and upon this record, the trial
court's action was eminently fair and correct and it
should be sustained by this court.
Respectfully submitted,

'

JOHN H. SNOW
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
7th Floor, Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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